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INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LABOR UNIONS UNDER THE 
LABOR REFORM ACT OF 1959* 
Archibald Coxt 
THE Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19591 has two main divisions. One deals with the internal 
affairs of labor organizations and, incidentally, with certain dis-
honest practices in labor-management relations tending to corrupt 
union officials. The other deals with labor-management relations 
as such. This article is confined to the first branch. 
J. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
In the Report of the United States Commission on Industrial 
Relations of 1914, John R. Commons wrote: 
"It has doubtless appealed to some people who consider the 
employer's position more powerful than that of the union, 
that the employer should be compelled in some way to deal 
with unions, or at least to confer with their representatives. 
But if the State recognizes any particular union by requiring 
the employer to recognize it, the State must necessarily guar-
antee the union to the extent that it must strip it of any abuses 
it may practice."2 
In retrospect it seems plain that the enactment of the LMRDA 
became inevitable when Congress, by enacting the Wagner Act,3 
not only granted employees the right to bargain collectively but 
also transported the political principle of majority rule into labor-
management relations by giving the union designated by the 
majority the exclusive right to represent all the employees in an 
appropriate bargaining unit. The bargaining representative has 
power, in conjunction with the employer, to fix a worker's wages, 
hours and conditions of employment without his consent.4 The 
employer and individual employee may not lawfully negotiate 
• Portions of this article were first delivered as a lecture at the Institute of Industrial 
Relations, University of California at Los Angeles. 
t Royall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.-Ed. 
lAct of September 14, 1959, Public Law 86-257, 86th Cong., 1st sess. 
2 U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUS"rRIAL RELATIONS 374 (1915). 
s 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. (1958) §§ 151-168. 
4See Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 at 202 (1944), in which Chief 
Justice Stone said on behalf of the Court, "Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining 
representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to 
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents .... " 
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terms or conditions of employment.5 As a matter of practice and 
probably in legal theory, the union controls the grievance pro-
cedure through which contracts are enforced.6 The government 
which confers this power upon labor organizations has a duty to 
insure that the power is not abused. 
The pressure for the actual enactment of such legislation came 
from three sources. Since World War II there had been a growing 
concern lest some unions, which were plainly instruments of in-
dustrial democracy in representing the rights of employees against 
employers, become too indifferent to democracy and the rights of 
minorities within the organization. One finds evidence of this 
school of thought in academic publications7 and the bills offered 
by the American Civil Liberties Union.8 Two unions, the Uphol-
sterers' International Union and the United Automobile Work-
ers, reacted by creating impartial appeal boards to review discipli-
nary action by the international against individual members or a 
local union. 
Second, the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the 
Labor or Management Field, popularly known as the McClellan 
Committee, began dramatizing related questions. The committee 
was principally concerned with the misuse of union funds by dis-
honest officers, with illicit profits, violence and racketeering and, 
in its later days, with secondary boycotts and organizational picket-
ing but, although its own hearings were frequently marred by dis-
respect for the rights of the witnesses, the committee also uncovered 
shocking evidence of internal misgovernment within a small hand-
ful of labor organizations. The disclosures built up pressure for 
reform. 
The third source of pressure was the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce and other 
employer organizations whose primary object appears to have been 
to use the outcry against corruption within labor unions as an 
occasion for revising labor-management relations laws in a man-
5 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). Cf J. I. Case Co. v. 
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
6 For a recent decision indicating that the union has power to settle grievances, see 
Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., (Md. 1958) 144 A. (2d) 88 (dictum). The 
point is discussed at length in Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 HAR.v. L 
REv. 601 (1956). 
7 E.g., Aaron and Komaroff, "Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs," 44 ILL. 
L. REv. 425, 631 (1949); Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 HARv. L. 
REv. 1049 (1951). 
s Hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor on Bills to Amend 
and Repeal the NLRA, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 3633-3643 (1947). 
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ner which would weaken the unions. The business lobbyists sought 
incidentally to "toughen" any proposal to regulate the conduct 
of unions or their officials even though the measure pertained ex-
clusively to relations between the unions and their own members. 
The LMRDA provisions dealing with internal union affairs 
stem from bills introduced by Senator Kennedy during the 85th 
Congress. The first would have required labor organizations to 
file complete financial reports with the Secretary of Labor, which 
would be open to public inspection.9 It also sought to bring to 
light by reporting all financial holdings or income of union officials 
which might create a conflict between their own selfish interests 
and unswerving loyalty to union members. The third principal 
division of this bill would have limited the power of interna-
tional unions to suspend local autonomy by trusteeships or re-
ceiverships. The Kennedy bill went far beyond the administra-
tion's proposal and was strongly attacked by AFL-CIO President 
Meany in his testimony before the Senate Labor Committee. Later, 
the strong congressional support for the still more stringent meas-
ures introduced by Senator Knowland10 convinced the most per-
ceptive leaders of the labor movement that a reform bill was in-
evitable. 
At this stage Senator Kennedy introduced a second bill,11 
which would require labor organizations to choose their officials 
in periodic elections either by secret ballot or by a convention 
of delegates chosen by secret ballot. The bill also laid down a few 
basic rules designed to secure every member an opportunity to 
vote without coercion or restraint. Enforcement was to be vested 
in the Secretary of Labor who was given power to conduct a new 
election if the first was proved illegal in a federal court. 
The Senate Labor Committee combined these bills with va-
rious provisions espoused by Senator McClellan the chief effect 
of which was to bar criminals from union office and to make various 
offenses against unions into federal crimes.12 The committee also 
recommended sweeping provisions requiring employers to report 
expenditures for labor relations and recommended minor changes 
in the Taft-Hartley Act desired by the labor movement. The lat-
ter changes were described as non-controversial because they were 
not only supported by Senator Kennedy and the northern Demo-
9 S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958). 
10 S. 3068, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958). 
11 S. 3751, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958). 
12 S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958); S. Rep. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958) 
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crats but also had been recommended by the President and Sec-
retary of Labor and approved by the Senate Labor Committee 
under Republican majorities. Senator Ives played a leading role 
in developing this measure and securing Republican support. 
The Kennedy-Ives bill wai, amended on the Senate floor in some 
details but it passed the Senate by a vote of 88 to 1 without substan-
tial change.13 The bill was killed in the House partly as a result 
of the combined opposition of business groups and labor unions.14 
At the start of the 86th Congress, Senator Kennedy introduced 
the Kennedy-Ervin bill, a refurbished version of the Kennedy-Ives 
measure.15 The provisions requiring financial reports by employ-
ers were substantially narrower than the corresponding sections 
of the Kennedy-Ives bill and some of the proposed amendments 
to the Taft-Hartley Act were narrowed or omitted. The changes 
made by the Labor Committee had the effect of making the regu-
lations more detailed, especially in the title dealing with elections, 
but they did not affect the theory or basic subject matter of the 
measure.16 The major issues during the floor debate involved Taft-
Hartley amendments which do not concern us here except for the 
introduction of a so-called "Bill of Rights" which ultimately be-
came Title I of the LMRDA.17 
Sentiment in the House of Representatives coalesced about 
three proposals. The first was a mild reform bill sponsored by 
Representative Shelley of California and supported by the labor 
movement and its most ardent sympathizers.18 In the middle of 
the road stood the Elliott bill.19 The Elliott bill was based upon 
the bill passed by the Senate but it contained a number of im-
portant modifications in the "Bill of Rights" and corrected some 
of the details of the Senate version. Its most important contribu-
tion, as events proved, was the introduction of a new section de-
claring the fiduciary duties of union officials and providing a 
federal remedy. At the extreme right was the Landrum-Griffin bill 
which combined the Senate version of the "Bill of Rights" and the 
Elliott proposals on reporting and disclosure, elections, trustee-
ships and the fiduciary duties of union officials but which substi-
18 104 CONG. REc. 11487 (1958). 
14 104 CoNG. REc. 18260 (1958). 
15 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959). 
16 S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959). 
17105 CoNG. REc. 5810-5811 (April 22, 1959); 105 CoNG. REc. 6005-6030 (April 25, 1959). 
18 H.R. 8490, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959). 
19 H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959). 
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tuted for the pro-labor Taft-Hartley amendments new restrictions 
upon secondary boycotts and organizational picketing.20 The Lan-
drum-Griffin bill also proposed to give the NLRB power to cede 
large portions of its jurisdiction to state courts and agencies gov-
erned by state law. Ultimately the House adopted the Landrum-
Griffin proposal21 and a Conference Committee was appointed. 
Although there were sharp differences between the House and 
Senate conferees upon some details of the proposed regulation of 
internal union affairs, the major controversy revolved about issues 
of labor-management relations law. After two weeks there was 
agreement upon a Conference Report. The report was adopted in 
both Houses by overwhelming votes22 and became the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 
Thus, the final regulation of internal union affairs came from 
several sources. The "Bill of Rights" is a modified version of 
Senator McClellan's proposal. The provisions subjecting union 
officials to fiduciary duties came from the Elliott bill. The core 
of the reporting requirements, the restrictions upon improper 
trusteeships and receiverships, and the electoral guarantees as well 
as the tightening of the criminal law were derived from the bills 
sponsored by Senator Kennedy. 
II. THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF UNION OFFICIALS 
In equity the large sums of money gathered into the treasuries 
of labor organizations belong to the members. The members are 
entitled to share in the management and expenditure of their 
funds, and to have a periodic accounting. The officers are fidu-
ciaries charged with handling the funds for the benefit, and in 
accordance with the instructions, of the members. The McClellan 
Committee hearings demonstrated that important union officials 
were stealing from the members, chiefly in the International Union 
of Operating Engineers, the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters and the United Textile Workers. There could be no dispute 
about the desirability of stamping out the thievery and raising 
obstacles to its repetition. The only problem was to devise the 
most effective methods. The LMRDA pursues three courses of 
action. 
20 H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959). 
21105 CoNG. REc. 14540-14541 (Aug. 14, 1959). 
22105 CoNG. REc. 16435 (Sept. 3, 1959); 105 CONG. REc. 16653-16654 (Sept. 4, 1959). 
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A. NEW CRIMINAL OFFENSES 
The act creates several new federal crimes involving financial 
dishonesty on the part of union officials. Embezzlement of the 
funds of a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce becomes a felony; 23 the willful destruction or falsifica-
tion of its records is punishable as a misdemeanor.24 Since the 
hearings uncovered large "loans" from union treasuries to union 
officials, which had not been repaid, the act forbids lending an 
officer or member more than $2,000.25 The prohibition may cause 
some inconvenience to international representatives transferred to 
new locations, for some unions previously lent them the capital 
necessary to resettle their families at a low rate of interest, but the 
blanket prohibition seems to be the only way to eliminate the use 
of loans to conceal embezzlement or to aid a dominant officer who 
wants capital for private speculation. In an effort to drive crim-
inals from the labor movement it was also made an offense to 
occupy a responsible union position or knowingly to permit one to 
occupy such a position within five years after conviction of specified 
crimes.26 
B. REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE 
The LMRDA also requires every labor organization in an in-
dustry affecting interstate commerce to file an annual financial 
report disclosing its receipts and disbursements together with the 
sources and purposes thereof.27 The reports are filed with the Secre-
tary of Labor on forms prescribed by him. They are open to union 
members, the press and the general public. A union is required to 
preserve the records necessary to verify and substantiate its re-
ports.28 The Secretary of Labor is authorized to investigate the 
accuracy of reports armed with the power to subpoena.29 Failure 
to file a report or filing an intentionally false report is punishable 
by fine or imprisonment.30 The Secretary is also given the rather 
unusual power to "report to interested persons or officials concern-
23 Section 501 (c). 
2-1 Section 209 (c). 
25 Section 503 (a). 
26 Section 504. 
27 Section 201. 
28 Sections 205-206, 209 (c). 
29 Section 601. 
30 Section 209. 
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ing the facts required to be shown in any report required by this 
Act and concerning the reasons for failure or refusal to file such a 
report or any other matter which he deems to be appropriate as 
a result of such an investigation."31 
This provision seeks to implement the basic theory of the stat-
ute - that the government should assure union members adequate 
information about the conduct of the union's financial affairs; 
that it should guarantee fair elections for the selection of officers; 
and that it should then trust the good sense of the members to 
remove any incompetent or dishonest officials. The Secretary's 
function is to furnish the members with the facts which should 
have been supplied by union officials. In legal usage "interested 
persons" means not the curious, but those who are substantially 
affected. Possibly the section permits an irresponsible Secretary 
to injure a union which displeases him by issuing hostile press 
releases without a hearing, but this is a power possessed by all 
prosecutors or investigators without express statutory authoriza-
tion.32 The risk is a small price to pay for the safeguard. 
It remains to be seen whether the theory of reporting and dis-
closure will discourage the repetition of past scandals and elim-
inate honest but careless financial practices. Similar sanctions 
have proved sufficiently effective in other contexts to justify their 
use before resorting to harsher methods. 
The preparation of reports will multiply paper work. The 
statute also requires each officer to obtain an individual bond.33 
It raises vague dangers of personal liability in the minds of men 
31 Section 601 (a). 
82 Glass v. Ickes, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 117 F. (2d) 273. 
33 Section 502. The interpretative bulletin issued by the Secretary of Labor rules that 
the bonding requirement is satisfied by a position schedule bond, i.e., one which covers 
any officials and union agents holding specified positions without naming the particular 
individuals. 29 C.F.R. §453.18 (Supp. 1960). This interpretation may well be a proper 
reading of statutory language. It appears to be buttressed by usage in the insurance field. 
It is quite plain, however, that many of the House and Senate conferees believed that 
§502 did not permit position schedule bonds but required either individual bonds or name 
schedule bonds. Senators Kennedy, Morse, McNamara and Randolph strenuously objected 
to this requirement. The conference accepted it by a majority vote only after protracted 
argument when it became apparent that the House view would have to be accepted if the 
conferees were to agree upon a report. Senator Morse opposed the conference report upon 
this ground among others. See 105 CoNG. REc. 16388 (Sept. 3, 1959). 
In the same regulation the Secretary of Labor construes §502 to require that union offi-
cials be bonded only for the proper handling of union funds. Although the bonding 
companies have suggested that §502 may be somewhat broader in scope, it seems quite 
plain that this interpretation not only conforms to the language of the statute but also 
carries out the intention of all the members of the conference committees. 
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to whom legal proceedings are unfamiliar. Local union offices 
carry no pay and little honor. Thus the statute may make it harder 
to fill the necessary offices. Compliance with the bonding and 
reporting requirements will entail considerable expense. The 
easiest way for the international unions to meet these problems is 
to merge a number of locals into a single unit, a trend which was 
evident before the LMRDA was enacted. Since there was no evi-
dence of past misconduct and little temptation to dishonesty in such 
cases, the Senate sought to minimize the problem by creating a 
revocable exemption for truly small unions,34 but the coalition of 
Republic,£ns and Southern Democrats insisted upon deleting the 
exemption in order to "toughen" the bill. Fortunately, the Sec-
retary of Labor is authorized to provide a simplifie~ form of report 
for small locals and his initial regulations appear well suited to 
minimizing the burden.35 
More disturbing than the outright thievery revealed by the 
McClellan Committee was the evidence of the use of union office 
for personal profit; for one suspects that the vice of playing both 
sides of the street, under-cover deals, and conflicts of interest infect 
a good many unions whose officials believe themselves to be per-
sonally honest. Two illustrations reported by the committee de-
serve mention. About 1950, according to the i:eport, Peter W. 
Weber, business manager of Local 825 of the International Union 
of Operating Engineers, secured a twelve percent interest in Pub-
lic Constructors, Inc., in exchange for a loan of $2,500. Public 
Constructors did business within the territorial jurisdiction of 
Local 825 and had collective bargaining agreements with that 
union. In negotiating and administering these contracts Weber's 
personal financial interests stood in direct conflict with unselfish 
devotion to the welfare of the employees. By 1959 the book value 
of his business interest had increased almost fifty-fold its cost -
to $108,677.36 Other evidence before the committee tended to 
show that James Hoffa held interests in firms with which the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters bargained.37 
Such conduct, if it occurred as reported, offends ancient moral 
precepts. The common law has condemned it for generations. 
AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Code IV states: 
34 S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st sess., §201 (d) (1959), as passed by Senate. 
35 Section 208. 24 Fed. Reg. 9931, 10105 (1959). The regulation will appear at 29 C.F.R. 
§§403.1 to 403.10. 
36 S. Hearings Before the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or 
Management Field, 85th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 20, 8134-8140 (1958). 
37 Id., 85th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 13, 5038 (1957). 
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" a basic ethical principle in the conduct of trade union 
affairs is that no responsible trade union official should have 
a personal financial interest which conflicts with the full per-
formance of his fiduciary duties as a workers' representative." 
The code then condemns a number of specific practices illus-
trating the basic principle - loans by a union to an officer, own-
ing an interest in a business with which the union bargains or an 
enterprise which is in competition with such a business, and owning 
an interest in an enterprise a substantial part of which consists of 
buying from, selling to, or otherwise dealing with a business with 
which the union bargains. 
Unfortunately the AFL-CIO lacks power to implement the code 
except by expelling an entire international union. It has no 
method of gathering evidence. It cannot proceed against individ-
uals. In many cases the sanction of expulsion would be too severe; 
in others too harmful to the labor movement. 
The original Kennedy bills sought to support the underlying 
moral precepts by requiring every union officer annually to report 
to the Secretary of Labor any holdings, income or transactions 
which created a potential conflict between his personal interests 
and loyalty to the members.38 These sections, which reach not 
only cases where the official has legal title, but also beneficial own-
ership held through "covers," "straws" or "blinds," were carried 
into the LMRDA without amendment.39 True criminals will un-
doubtedly ignore the duty to report but the detailed and unequiv-
ocal legislative condemnation of specific holdings and transactions 
should go far toward establishing a higher standard of conduct. 
The official whose fingers itch for a "fast buck" but who is not a 
criminal will be deterred by the fear of prosecution if he files no 
report and by fear of reprisal from the members if he does. 
C. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 
Despite the scarcity of direct precedent, it seems plain that 
all union officers and employees have always been subject to the 
usual common-law fiduciary duties of an agent.40 Violations are 
redressible in the state courts. The duty is so seldom enforced, 
38 S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d sess., §102 (1958). 
39 Section 202. 
40 Union officers are obviously agents. All true agents owe fiduciary obligations to their 
principals. AGENCY R.EsTATEMENT SECOND §§387-398 (1958). Curiously, there appear to be 
only two judicial opinions which set forth the rule. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 345 
(1941); Tinkler v. Powell, 23 Wyo. 352, 151 P. 1097 (1915). 
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however, that the House Labor ·committee adopted, and the 
Senate approved, an amendment giving it a federal statutory base. 
Section 501 (a) states in general terms the union agent's obligation 
to act solely for the benefit of his principal, to be loyal, to re-
frain from competing with his principal or acquiring conflicting 
interests and "to account . . . for any profit received by him in 
whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by 
him or under his direction." The principles stated in section 
501 (a) were drawn from the Restatement of Agency in an effort to 
incorporate the whole body of common law precedents defining 
the fiduciary obligations of agents and trustees41 with such adapta-
tions as might be required to take into account "the special prob-
lems and functions of a labor organization .... "42 
Section 50 I (b) authorizes any union member to bring a suit 
in the federal court in the nature of a minority stockholder's 
bill whenever his union refuses to sue an officer or employee 
alleged to be guilty of a breach of fiduciary obligations. The trial 
judge may allot part of any sums recovered for counsel fees and 
expenses. All the usual remedies for breach of trust are available.43 
These provisions are potentially among the most important 
in the LMRDA. If individual members have the initiative and in-
terest to bring suit, the Becks, Hoffas and Webers may be required 
to account not only for alleged misappropriations but also for all 
the profits which they may have made by virtue of their offices. 
If the findings of the McClellan Committee were sustained in 
court, equity would impose a trust for the benefit of the Operating 
Engineers upon Weber's stock in Public Constructors; Beck would 
be required to account for the moneys or gifts allegedly received 
from Nathan Shefferman; and, if Hoffa received loans from the 
Teamsters, he might well be required to account not only for the 
money but also for any proceeds of his investment. 
Section 50 I imposes no restrictions upon the purposes for 
which a labor organization may expend its funds. The propriety 
of union activities other than collective bargaining, such as chari-
table contributions and support for political candidates, may 
be fairly debatable but this is a separate issue of too great im-
portance for the courts to resolve by interpreting a provision 
which deals directly with only the duties of union agents to the 
41 See AGENCY REsrATEMENT SECOND §§387, 388, 389 and 394 (1958). 
42 Section 501 (a). 
43 Section 501 (b) provides that the action may be brought to "recover damages or 
secure an accounting or other appropriate relief." 
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organization and its members. Read in their context the words are 
plain; it is made the duty of the union officers and agents "to 
manage, invest, and expend ... [the union's money and property] 
in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions 
of the governing bodies adopted thereunder." An agent who fol-
lows the instructions of his principal is not guilty of a breach of 
fiduciary duties. Section 501 emphasizes the importance of giving 
careful attention to the constitutional provisions and resolutions 
of governing bodies but where the union grants the necessary 
authority, no statutory restriction is imposed. If there were am-
biguity it would be dispelled by the statement of five members 
of the House Labor Committee in reporting the committee bill, for 
they were the five who sponsored the bill and they included Con-
gressman O'Hara, who proposed section 50 I in the Labor Com-
mittee.44 Senator Kennedy gave a similar explanation in present-
ing the Conference Report.45 
Ill. INTERNAL UNION DEMOCRACY 
In a rudimentary modern political sense democracy implies 
(a) control of governing decisions by those affected and (b) a 
decent respect for the fundamental rights of individuals and mi-
norities, not only by the individuals in power but also by the 
ruling majority. No politician dares publicly to question the 
value of democracy in the government of labor organizations but 
among academicians there is quiet and serious debate. According 
to one view, labor unions should be regarded as military organiza-
tions, for their function is to wage economic warfare with employ-
ers who are constantly feeling out chinks in the unions' defenses 
through which to wound, if not destroy, them. As a wartime army 
can neither brook divided leadership nor tolerate active dissi-
dents so must a union punish the trouble-makers in order to close 
ranks against employers and rival organizations. The sophisticated 
exponents of this view also contend that since union officials have 
better training and more experience than rank and file members, 
those officials who are given the power will act more responsibly 
in enforcing the union's obligations to employers, will present 
fewer preposterous or impractical demands and, if allowed the 
power, will enforce their decisions. Professor John T. Dunlop 
warns us: 
« H. Rep. 741, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 81-82 (1959). 
45 105 CONG. R.Ec. 16540 (Sept. 3, 1959). 
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"Already we are seeing employers who urged Congress to pass 
'strong legislation' affecting internal union government going 
to national union officers as of old seeking national union sup-
port to restrain the demands of locals and to make agreements. 
They are not likely to get as much cooperation; they could not 
be given as much. The country has chosen on the grounds of 
morality and democracy to make wage stability more difficult 
to achieve." 
The advocates of this position hope to improve union govern-
ment by creating a sense of professional responsibility among union 
officials. Perhaps the partial professionalization of management is 
an encouraging precedent. 
But the argument is hardly persuasive. An autocratic union 
may serve the material demands of its members by bargaining 
effectively for higher wages and increased benefits. It may estab-
lish a measure of job security. None except a democratic union, 
however, can achieve the idealistic aspirations which justify labor 
organizations. Collective bargaining may limit the employer's 
power by substituting a negotiated agreement for arbitrary tyranny 
of the boss, but it scarcely extends the rule of law to substitute an 
autocratic union. Only in a democratic union can workers, 
through chosen representatives, participate jointly with manage-
ment in the government of their industrial lives even as all of us 
may participate, through elected representatives, in political gov-
ernment. 
The state alone cannot achieve true union democracy but it 
has much to contribute. Preserving democracy requires pro-
tecting individuals and minorities against numerical majorities 
or an officialdom which acts with the majority's consent. It is 
not enough to put our trust in self-restraint. The task of assur-
ing workers the ultimate control of the affairs of their unions 
should be undertaken by law because it is the law which gives a 
union, as bargaining representative, the quasi-legislative power 
to bind employees in the bargaining unit without their consent. 
Half a century ago unions were too fragile to survive internal 
dissension, but surely no one seriously doubts the current ability 
of the major labor organizations to survive free elections, free 
debate and a decent respect for minorities among the members. 
To show that union officials have a better grasp of economic 
policy than the rank and file and a higher sense of obligation does 
not demonstrate the wisdom of aristocratic government in labor 
relations for the same reasons that the parallel argument fails in 
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relation to the government of nations. Leadership is required, but 
it should be achieved by the arts of the statesman and not the easy 
road of compulsion with its denials of opportunity and temptations 
to tyranny and sloth. The proper balance between control by the 
membership and the executive direction necessary to effective 
action cannot be achieved by general debate about the desirability 
of democracy; it involves specific questions concerning the dis-
position of power and the frequency of elections.46 
A. The Bill of Rights for Union Members 
Although the bill sponsored by the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare protected many of the interests of 
union members, its provisions concentrated upon specific areas 
in which abuses had occurred and for which existing remedies 
appeared inadequate - the handling of funds, conflicts of interest, 
union elections, international trusteeships and racketeering. Sen-
ator Kennedy and his advisers were acutely aware of what they 
de~med the risks of destroying self-government within the labor 
unions. 
"Trade unions have made a commendable effort to correct 
internal abuses; hence the committee believes that only essen-
tial standards should be imposed by legislation. Moreover, in 
establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care 
should be taken not to undermine union self-government or 
weaken unions in their role as collective-bargaining agents."47 
There were others who did not share this concern. On the 
Senate floor Senator McClellan, who had introduced bills to es-
tablish a system of union registration and prescribe the terms of 
union constitutions and by-laws, sponsored an amendment to create 
a "bill of rights" for union members.48 The amendment contained 
sweeping guarantees in absolute terms of freedom of speech and 
assembly, and of "equal rights and privileges" in voting, participa-
tion at meetings and the handling of grievances. There were tight 
restrictions upon increases in union dues. The expulsion of a mem-
ber was prohibited unless there was a verbatim stenographic tran-
script of the trial and review by an outsider. Members' rights were 
made enforceable by a suit for an in junction. Willful violations 
were made felonies. 
46 See pp. 842-845 infra. 
47 S. Rep. 187, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 7 (1959). 
48 105 ':°NG. REc. 5810-5811 (April 22, 1959). 
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The sponsors of the amendment may have counted upon cau-
tious judicial interpretation to qualify its vague and sweeping 
absolutes much as the constitutional Bill of Rights is tempered by 
judicial decisions; and possibly they were right. The critics 
doubted whether even the Supreme Court would interpret statu-
tory restrictions upon a labor union in the same fashion as con-
stitutional limitations upon the Congress. They feared that in-
ferior courts, many of the judges being extremely hostile to unions, 
would give the sweeping phrases their fullest, literal meaning. In 
any event, it seemed extremely unfair to ask a union official to 
accept such risks as presiding over a meeting under threat of con-
viction for a felony if one of his rulings was later held to deny a 
member freedom of speech. 
Other provisions seemed impractical, especially the guaranty 
of "equal rights and privileges" in every phase of union activity. 
Workers are constantly complaining that management and union 
officials have mishandled their grievances and some form of safe-
guard is desirable.49 The McClellan bill of rights seemed to pro-
vide that such complaints should be investigated by the Secretary 
of Labor whenever it was alleged that the union failed to grant 
"equal rights and privileges," thus transferring the grievance from 
the shop floor to governmental channels. Again, fairness sometimes 
requires differentiations within the ranks of union members. Many 
local unions have a mixed membership. A local of the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, for example, may in-
clude construction workers and also members from a power com-
pany or a manufacturing concern. If the business on the agenda 
were whether to go on strike or ratify a proposed contract covering 
electrical construction, it would seem reasonable to bar the indus-
trial members from the vote. If a local industrial union had mem-
bers from four non-competitive factories whose employees com-
posed four bargaining units, it might be reasonable to provide in 
the by-laws that only the members employed at a particular com-
pany should vote upon items of business confined to that bargain-
ing unit. To outlaw such by-laws seemed unnecessarily to curtail 
the opportunities of self-determination. 
The Senate adopted the McClellan amendment by a vote of 47 
to 46,150 but strong sentiment for modification immediately sprang 
49 For comprehensive discussions of this problem, see Report of the Committee on 
Improvement of the Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, ABA, SEcnoN OF LAlloR 
RELATIONS LAw PROC. 33 (1954); Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement,'' 69 HARv. L. 
REv. 601 (1956). . 
50 105 CONG. REc. 5827 (April 22, 1959). 
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up not only among its opponents but also in the ranks of Southern 
supporters who came to realize that the authorization of govern-
mental suits for injunctions to enforce private rights would be an 
embarrassing precedent in future debates over civil rights legisla-
tion. During the next two days a compromise was drafted. Many 
groups had to be consulted and since the Senate had proceeded to 
other sections of the bill the work was done late at night or in little 
knots upon the Senate floor. The draftsmanship left much to be 
desired, perhaps because of the haste and stress, the number of 
participants, and the priority of tactical acceptability over nicety 
of expression. The Senate approved the compromise by an over-
whelming vote.151 
Legislative tactics also triumphed over sound draftsmanship in 
the House of Representatives. The draftsman of the Landrum-
Griffin bill incorporated the bill of rights passed by the Senate be-
cause its sponsors had instructed him not to write any original pro-
visions. The Landrum-Griffin bill was approved upon the House 
floor without prior consideration in committee. Since there were 
no differences between the Senate and House bills in this respect, 
under parliamentary law the conferees were powerless to revise the 
bill of rights. Thus, these sections never received the careful 
technical review and clarification which comes from scrutiny by a 
congressional committee and its legislative staff. 
Participation in Union Affairs. Section 101 (a) (I) of the 
LMRDA guarantees all union members "equal rights and priv-
ileges" in nominating candidates and voting in union elections, in 
attending union meetings, and in discussing and voting upon union 
affairs, all "subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such 
organization's constitution and bylaws." The qualification is the 
result of the accommodation between the practicalities of union 
government and the commendable aim of preventing unjust dis-
crimination between union members. Time and litigation will 
be required to determine what are "reasonable rules and regula-
tions," but the basic distinction is not hard to illustrate. The 
division of members into voting and non-voting classes exemplified 
by the prior practice of the Operating Engineers is contrary to sec-
tion 101 (a). On the other hand, in local unions with a mixed 
membership it would be reasonable, as shown above, to limit the 
voting upon specific issues to those who are directly concerned. 
151105 CoNG. REc. 6030 (April 25, 1959). 
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Discrimination against apprentices is probably unreasonable, 
although the distinction has the possible justification that they are 
usually less mature than journeymen members while they are learn-
ing the trade. The Culinary Workers, Barbers, and other unions 
which admit employers to membership will probably have to 
choose, when subject to the act, between granting employers the 
right to participate in meetings, which has heretofore been denied, 
and surrendering this method of subjecting employers to the 
union's rules·. The principle underlying section 101 (a) (I) is that 
those who are bound, as members, by the union's decisions should 
have the opportunity to take part in the deliberations. All mem-
bers are plainly entitled to vote in union elections for the statutory 
right of each member to cast one vote cannot be qualified by even 
a reasonable rule.52 
Some unions allow retired employees and workers who have 
left the trade or industry to retain their cards as non-voting- in.em-
bers. Surely this is reasonable in substance, but the technical doubt 
could be minimized by constitutional amendments establishing a 
special category of members emeriti who, like retired professors, 
would retain the dignity and social status of members but lose their 
rights and duties. 
Section 101 (a) (I) may also help to check the use of violence to 
suppress dissent, which every student of union government knows 
to occur even though he cannot document the assertion. To evict 
a dissident from a meeting would violate section 101 (a) (I) unless 
he violated normal rules of decorum. Interference with a critic's 
right to speak, offer motions and vote would also be unlawful. 
Freedom of Speech and Assembly. Section 101 (a) (2) carries 
the legal protection of dissent a step farther by guaranteeing union 
members freedom of speech both inside and outside union meet-
ings, and also by securing the critics an opportunity to meet for the 
purpose of organizing their opposition. The latter privilege would 
seem essential to the formation of effective minorities even though 
it flies in the face of traditional trade union opposition to any form 
of caucus or separate assemblage. However, dissent in a union, like 
treason within a nation, must be suppressed if the purpose is to 
52 Section 401 (e). The Secretary of Labor has ruled that the proviso to §101 (a) (1) 
qualifies §401 (e) apparently upon the theory that this interpretation is necessary to avoid 
inconsistency. But the specific provision is §401 (e) which deals with voting in elections, 
and under the normal rules of statutory interpretation the specific provision should control. 
The Secretary has also ruled, contrary to the text above, that apprentices may be denied 
the right to vote. 29 C.F.R. §452.10 (Supp. 1960). Since the Secretary is in charge of all 
proceedings to enforce the elections requirements these interpretations will control. 
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destroy the union, encourage a rival, or bring about the violation of 
legal or contractual obligations. Section 101 (a) (2) contains an 
exception for these cases. 
Dues and Assessments. Section 101 (a) (3) prohibits a local 
union from increasing its dues or assessments except by a secret 
vote of the members in a referendum or a meeting called for the 
purpose. An international union may make an increase at a con-
vention or by a referendum of the members and, for the period 
before the next convention, by vote of the executive board or sim-
ilar governing body. The only serious question raised by this pro-
vision concerns the manner of raising the payments due the inter-
national union in situations where the member pays all his dues 
to the local union and the local pays a per capita tax to the inter-
national. Since there is no evidence of an intention to affect the 
ability of unions to raise money or to regulate the allocation of 
power between local and international unions, section 101 (a) (3) 
should be read as a specification of the forms through which each 
body should express its will when the union constitution requires 
its action, without affecting other aspects of the process. An inter-
national could therefore raise the per capita tax by any of the 
statutory methods without the assent of the local union, but the 
local would decide whether to increase the share of the dues paid 
to the international or actually raise the dues. 
Disciplinary Procedure. Although the rules were originally 
formulated in cases involving religious organizations, social clubs, 
and somewhat later, fraternal benefit associations, the courts 
evolved satisfactory rules applicable to the expulsion of union 
members long prior to enactment of the LMRDA. Upon the 
theory that improper expulsion violates the member's interest 
in the organization's property or a contract between him and other 
members made up of the constitution and by-laws or, in recent 
years, upon the ground that there is a tortious interference with an 
advantageous relationship, the state will set an expulsion aside 
upon any of five grounds: 
(I) The procedure violated the union's constitution or 
by-laws.53 
53 Harris v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 733, 221 P. (2d) 136 
(1950); Walsh v. Reardon, 274 Mass. 530, 174 N.E. 912 (1931); Howland v. Local 306, 
UAW·CIO, 323 Mich. 305, 35 N.W. (2d) 166 (1948); Savard v. Industrial Trades Union of 
America, 76 R.I. 496, 72 A. (2d) 660 (1950). 
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(2) The constitution or by-laws did not authorize expul-
sion for the alleged offense.54 
(3) The procedure, although it conformed to the union's 
constitution and by-laws, did not afford the member a fair 
hearing.55 
(4) The expulsion, although it was authorized by the 
union's constitution and by-laws, was "unreasonable," con-
trary to "public policy," or contrary to "natural justice."56 
(5) The expulsion was in bad faith because the purported 
ground was only a pretense for getting rid of a troublesome 
member.57 
The rule invalidating expulsion without a hearing requires 
observance of much the same minimum safeguards as the due 
process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has been 
held to impose upon the adjudicative procedures of the state and 
federal governments. The accused member must be given an op-
portunity to hear the charge,58 to present evidence in his defense,59 
and to confront and probably to cross-examine the witnesses against 
him.60 Any special trial body may not include his accusers,61 but 
presumably a trial may be held before the full membership. It 
seems unlikely that the accused member is entitled to the aid of a 
lawyer in his defense. The accused is entitled to be put upon a 
roughly equal footing with the prosecutors. If they are laymen, 
surely he is entitled to no more professional assistance. Although 
54 Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 P. 217 (1888). 
55 Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y.S. 1 (1919). Contra, State ex rel. Dame 
v. Le Fevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W. (2d) 349 (1947). 
56 See Swaine v. Miller, 72 Mo. App. 444 at 446 (1897); Spayd v. Ringing Roel< Lodge 
No. 665, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 (1921); Chafee, "The In-
ternal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit," 43 HARV. L. Rl!.v. 993 at 1015-1018 (1930). 
Cf. Dawkins v. Antrobus, [1881] 44 L.T.R. (n.s.) 557 at 559-560 (dictum). 
57 Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 P. 217 (1888); Fleming v. Moving 
Picture Mach. Operators, 16 N.J. Misc. 502, I A. (2d) 850 (1938), affd. 124 N.J. Eq. 269, 1 
A. (2d) 386 (1938); Kuzych v. White, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 187. Cf. Eschman v. Huebner, 226 
Ill. App. 537 (1922). 
58Armant v. Cannon Employees, (Cal. Super. 1942) 11 L.R.R.M. 752 (member not 
informed of evidence against him); "\'\'alsh v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage 
Employees, 22 N.J. Misc. 161, 37 A. (2d) 667 (1944) (charge too vague); Bartone v. Di Pietro, 
18 N.Y.S. (2d) 178 (1939) (no notice of nature of charge). 
-59 Cotton Jammers' and Longshoremen's Assn. v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56 
S.W. 553 (1900) (alternative holding). 
60 Armant v. Cannon Employees, (Cal. Super. 1942) 11 L.R.R.M. 752; Brooks v. Engar, 
259 App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 114, appeal dismissed mem., 284 N.Y. 767, 31 N.E. (2d) 
514 (1940); Fales v. Musicians' Protective Union, 40 RJ. 34, 99 A. 823 (1917). 
61 Gaestel v. Brotherhood of Painters, 120 N .J. Eq. 358, 185 A. 36 (1936); Coleman v. 
O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S. (2d) 812 (1945) (alternative holding), appeal dismissed as moot mem., 
269 App. Div. 972, 58 N.Y.S. (2d) 358 (1945). Cf. Cohen v. Rosenburg, 252 App. Div. 274, 
27 N.Y.S. (2d) 834 (1941), affd. per curiam, 287 N.Y. 800, 40 N.E. (2d) 1018 (1942). 
1960] LABOR REFORM AcT 837 
the union officers, who are likely to be behind the prosecutors, are 
usually more skilled than ordinary members in the rules of pro-
cedure, turning a trial over to professional advocates would entail 
disproportionate loss in self-government. 
The common law grew more slowly in picking out the line 
between permissible grounds of expulsion and grounds which are 
inadequate despite the authority in the constitution or by-laws. 
A member may be expelled for strike-breaking,62 for working at 
wages below the union scale, 63 or for aiding an employer to obtain 
an injunction against a strike.64 But a member of a licensing board 
cannot be lawfully expelled by his union because his officials dis-
please it, 65 nor may a union expel a member for testifying against 
it under oath in an arbitration proceeding. 66 The familiar pro-
vision in union constitutions which states that bringing suit against 
the union is cause for expulsion is plainly invalid.67 There is a nice 
factual line to be drawn between legitimate criticism, which as an 
exercise of the privilege of free speech will not justify expulsion, 
and stirring up dissension within the union, which is a justifica-
tion.68 The most difficult issues involve the right of a union to 
control its members' activities in fields outside the sphere of col-
lective bargaining but vitally important to the welfare of its mem-
bers.69 
The LMRDA deals with union membership haphazardly. Sec-
tion 101 (a) (5) incorporates into the federal statute the existing 
common law prohibiting the suspension or discipline of a union 
member except for nonpayment of dues "unless such member has 
62 Becker v. Calnan, 313 Mass. 625, 48 N.E. (2d) 668 (1943); Havens v. King, 221 App. 
Div. 475, 224 N.Y.S. 193 (1927), affd. per curiam sub nom. Havens v. Dodge, 250 N.Y. 617, 
166 N.E. 346 (1929). 
63 Cf. O'Keefe v. Local 463, United Assn. of Plumbers, 277 N.Y. 300, 14 N.E. (2d) 77 
(1938); Schmidt v. Rosenburg, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 364 (1944), affd. mem. 269 App. Div. 685, 54 
N.Y.S. (2d) 379 (1945). 
64 Burke v. Monumental Div., No. 52, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, (D.C. 
Md. 1922) 286 F. 949, affd. per curiam, (4th Cir. 1924) 298 F. 1019, revd. per curiam on 
other grounds, 270 U.S. 629 (1926). 
65 Schneider v. Local 60, United Assn. Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270, 40 S. 700 
(1905). 
66 Cf. Angrisani v. Stearn, 167 Misc. 731, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 701 (1938), affd. mem. 255 
App. Div. 975, 8 N.Y.S. (2d) 997 (1938); Thompson v. Grand Intl. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S.W. 834 (1905); Link-Belt Speeder Corp., 2 
Lab. Arb. Rep. 338 (1945). 
67 Burke v. Monumental Div., No. 52 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, (D.C. 
Md. 1919) 273 F. 707. See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40 at 69 (1947) Gackson, J., 
dissenting). 
68 See Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1049 at 
1069-1071, 1074 (1951). 
~9 See Cox, I.Aw AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 106-111 (1960). 
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been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reason-
able time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hear-
ing." Section 101 (a) (4) probably forbids discipline for bringing 
suit against a union.70 Section 609 forbids punishing a member 
"for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the pro-
visions of this Act." 
No useful purpose is served by these provisions, unless it is to 
publicize the availability of remedies. Section 101 (a) (5) merely 
incorporates the common-law test of a fair hearing. No additional 
substantive law was required, and none was created. The need was 
for a more practical remedy than suit by an individual employee. 
Congress failed to provide one. Since the federal provisions do not 
exclude state law,71 their principal consequence will be to increase 
litigation in the federal courts. Violations of the federal statute are 
actionable in the district courts of the United States.72 In all other 
cases improper discipline will give rise to a state cause of action, 
precisely as in the past. There is no merit to the argument that the 
federal right is exclusive.73 One telling criticism of the McClellan 
bill of rights was that its haphazard guarantee of some rights would 
disturb the more complete safeguards under state judicial deci-
sions.74 The saving clause preserving all the "rights and remedies 
of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal 
law or before any court or other tribunal"75 was inserted to meet 
this criticism. The obvious intent is to allow the members to enjoy 
the benefit of the most favorable rule. 
In some situations the member may be in a position to allege 
facts giving rise to both federal and state causes of action. Both 
could be entertained by a state court. The jurisdictional problem 
is more difficult if the action is brought in the federal court, 
especially if the federal cause of action fails, for it might be argued 
in the absence of diversity of citizenship that the federal court lacks 
power to adjudicate the state cause of action. Probably the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction would save the plaintiff's case. The 
two causes of action are bound to be closely related. Much the same 
proof would be material under both. The relief sought would 
nearly always be the same.76 
70 See pp. 839-841 infra. 
71 Section 103. 
72 Section 102. 
73 But see Hickey, "The Bill of Rights of Union Members," 48 GEO. L.J. 226 (1959). 
74 105 CONG. REc. 5816-5822 (April 22, 1959). 
75 Section 103. 
76 For a discussion of pendent jurisdiction, see HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 797-809 (1953). 
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Right To Sue. At common law the rights of individual mem-
bers can be enforced only by individual suits; the initiative and 
costs necessary for prosecution must come from the member. The 
LMRDA preserves this condition except that the election and 
trusteeship titles are enforceable by the Secretary of Labor upon 
the complaint of a member.77 Section 101 (a) (4) grants additional 
protection for this right, but its meaning is obscure because the 
draftsman also failed to distinguish two radically different kinds 
of limitations upon a union member's freedom to sue the organiza-
tion. 
One limitation is the familiar provision in union constitutions 
which declares that bringing suit against the union is cause for ex-
pulsion unless the member has exhausted his internal remedies.78 
This restriction is against public policy. No private organization 
should be permitted to restrict any person's access to courts of 
justice. The right should be as absolute as the right to appear in 
court as a witness, to petition on a legislature, or to communicate 
with a member of Congress. 
A quite different kind of limitation is imposed by the judicial 
doctrine that a court will not entertain a member's action against 
a labor organization until he has exhausted all adequate remedies 
within the organization. The rule is one of judicial administration. 
It applies not only to suits involving the internal affairs of all forms 
of voluntary association,79 but also to actions upon ordinary con-
tracts, including collective bargaining agreements.80 In an exag-
gerated form the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine may deny legal 
relief to a plaintiff whose internal remedy is vain, too slow or too 
expensive, but when wisely administered, the doctrine strengthens 
the independence and self-government of private associations. 
Courts and administrative agencies should not interfere in the 
internal affairs of labor organizations, if union democracy is our 
goal, until the organization has had a reasonable opportunity to 
correct any mistakes of subordinate bodies. 
It is not clear whether section 101 (a) (4) affects both limita-
tions upon suits by union members, or only the first, leaving the 
courts free to apply the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine wherever 
appropriate. The sponsors of the bill of rights and other amend-
77 Sections 304 and 402. 
78 E.g., Constitution of International Union of United Mine Workers of America, effec-
tive November 1, 1948, art. IX. 
79 7 C.J .S., Associations §34 {b) (1937). 
80 The labor cases are collected in Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 HARv. 
L. REv. 601 at 647-649 (1956). 
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ments adopted on the floor of the Senate were much less con-
cerned with encouraging democratic self-government than the 
supporters of the original Kennedy bills. Some of the conferees 
were not sympathetic to the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine. The 
proviso permitting a union to require a man to exhaust internal 
remedies available within four months is more appropriately linked 
with the judicial doctrine than with restrictions imposed by the 
union itself. There are, however, a number of persuasive reasons 
for concluding that section 101 (a) (4) should not be construed to 
interfere with the exhaustion-of-remedies rule. 
(a) The words of section 101 (a) (4) literally refer only to 
limitations imposed by a labor union, not to judicial rules of de-
cision. "No labor organization shall limit the right of any member 
thereof to institute an action in any court .... "81 The full text 
confirms the literal reading. It obviously refers to union rules and 
union discipline interfering with the rights to testify and petition 
the legislature. The guaranty of the right to sue is expressed in the 
same terms. 
(b) The exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine applies in the state 
courts no less than federal forums. Section 101 (a) (4) also applies 
to state proceedings no less than federal, whatever may be the 
proper interpretation. It seems unlikely that Congress would so 
lightly sweep aside state rules of judicial administration. 
(c) The broad interpretation would give section 101 (a) (4) a 
curious backlash. If it regulates the legal proceedings brought by 
individual members by abolishing the exhaustion-of-remedies 
doctrine whenever the delay would exceed four months, must it 
not also regulate such proceedings by allowing unions to require 
the exhaustion of any remedies which consume less than four 
months? If so, a labor union may now require a member to resort 
to proceedings within the union before filing charges under the 
NLRA. There was no such doctrine in the past. 
(d) Reading section 101 (a) (4) to interfere with judicial and 
administrative rules of decision creates still other perplexities. It 
applies to all suits by union members regardless of the identity of 
the defendant. Does it therefore overturn the rule that an em-
ployee may not sue an employer to enforce a collective bargaining 
agreement until he has exhausted the grievance procedure? Some 
labor contracts stipulate that no individual employee shall be 
81 Emphasis supplied. 
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entitled to any right or remedy outside the grievance procedure. 
In other cases unions negotiate adjustments intended to bind 
the grievants. To extend section 101 (a) (4) into these areas would 
greatly interfere with collective bargaining in ways which Congress 
never considered.82 Under the narrower interpretation the damage 
would not be done, but the provision would still serve a useful 
and necessary purpose as a guarantee against restrictions imposed 
by union rules. 
The legislative history gives little guidance. Senator Kennedy's 
exposition of the Conference Report just before the Senate vote 
espoused the narrower interpretation, 83 but some of the House con-
ferees undoubtedly hoped that the broader construction would 
prevail. The ambiguity is traceable partly to this difference of 
opinion but primarily to the hasty manner in which the compro-
mise bill of rights was prepared. 
Admission to Union Membership. The most glaring defect 
in the common-law rights of employees vis-a-vis their representative 
for the purpose of collective bargaining was the want of legal 
remedies for unfair or discriminatory denials of membership. It 
is a black-letter rule that no one has a legally-protected right to be-
come a member of a voluntary association.84 Consequently, a union 
may exclude an applicant for any reason, good or bad, or for no 
reason. It may even discriminate upon grounds of race, color, sex 
or religion. 
Until recently there was reason to hope that the courts might 
gradually change the rule applicable to labor unions. Its repetition 
gives it a stronger ring of authority than the direct precedents 
warrant. Union membership rarely involves the close personal 
association which must have influenced the courts in their refusal 
to compel social clubs to admit unwanted members, nor does eligi-
bility tum upon the theological niceties pertinent to religious 
organizations. Unions exercise powers under the National Labor 
Relations and Railway Labor Acts which are greater than the 
power of other voluntary associations - much greater indeed than 
the powers which unions exercised prior to the legislation. Since 
82 Powell, "The Bill of Rights-Its Impact Upon Employers," 48 GEO. L.J. 270 at 271-
273 (1959). For a more general discussion, see Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement,'' 
69 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1956). 
83 105 CoNG. REc. 16414 (Sept. 4, 1959). 
84 87 C.J .S., Trade Unions §33 (1954). But the modern view denies a union the privi-
lege of enforcing closed-shop contracts against those to whom it has arbitrarily denied 
admission. See James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944). 
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union membership is correspondingly more important, this factor 
was ample ground for distinguishing the earlier cases and recog-
nizing a legally-protected interest in a fair opportunity to become 
a member of the union which acts as the bargaining representative 
of the unit in which the applicant is employed.85 It was also pos-
sible to argue that performance of the representative's duty of 
fair representation requires admitting all members of the bar-
gaining unit to union membership, in the absence of proper cause 
for exclusion, because membership is the best assurance that the 
employee's voice will be heard and his interests be represented. 
Unfortunately, the decision in Ross v. Ebert,86 and the Supreme 
Court's refusal to review the Oliphant case87 have discouraged, if 
not permanently foreclosed, this avenue of progress. 
The LMRDA "bill of rights" does nothing to correct the evil. 
The prospect for new federal legislation is also dim. Unions oppose 
giving legal remedies for the unfair or discriminatory denial of 
membership partly because of a belief that absolute freedom to 
select members is the right of a voluntary association and partly 
upon the practical ground that forced integration would prevent 
the unionization of southern workers. Congressmen from the 
southern states oppose such legislation as part of the battle over 
segregation. 
As a practical matter, therefore, protection of the public interest 
in affording employees an opportunity to participate in the affairs 
of the unions which represent them rests in the hands of the labor 
movement. If the AFL-CIO would take stronger measures to press 
its affiliates to conform to its constitutional provisions against dis-
crimination, 88 it might well find that the gains from a revival of 
conscience offset any immediate practical loss. 
B. Union Elections 
The election of officers is the heart of union democracy. The 
policies of any large organization must be formulated and admin-
istered by a small group of officials. Their responsiveness to the 
members depends upon the frequency of elections, a fair oppor-
ss cf. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35 at 37, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 882 (1941), modified 263 
App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S. (2d) 849 (1941); Raevsky v. Upholsterers' Intl. Union, 38 Pa. D. & C. 
187 at 195 (1940). 
86 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W. (2d) 315 (1957). 
87 Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, (N.D. Ohio 1957) 156 F. Supp. 89, 
cert. den. 355 U.S. 893 (1957), affd. (6th Cir. 1958) 262 F. (2d) 359, cert. den. 359 U.S. 935 
(1959). 
88 AFL-CIO CONST., ART. II, §4. 
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tunity to nominate and vote for candidates, and an honest count of 
the ballots. 
Commentators are in disagreement as to the capacity of the 
common law to police the electoral process in labor organizations.89 
A court can undoubtedly grant effective relief against violations of 
a union's own constitutions and by-laws, except where foreclosed 
by doctrinal rulings requiring the violation of a property right, 
but it would be hard for the court to supervise elections and 
virtually impossible to supply the minimum electoral guarantees 
if they were missing from the union's constitution. 
The LMRDA establishes comprehensive requirements for the 
conduct of union elections. Local officers must be elected every 
three years or oftener by secret ballot of the members or by a con-
vention chosen by secret ballot.90 International officers must be 
elected every five years or oftener by a secret ballot of the members 
or by a convention of delegates chosen by secret ballot.91 Officers 
of bodies intermediate between the local and the international 
must be elected not less often than every four years but the choice 
may be made by other union officers.92 Probably the election pro-
visions are inapplicable to bodies made up of representatives from 
several different unions not affiliated with the same international 
union - the building and construction trades councils, for 
example. These organizations, although they engage in collective 
bargaining, are neither international unions nor local unions, 
which were the terms of art used in the Kennedy bills.93 The word 
"organization" was later substituted for "union" throughout the 
bill as part of a purely formal change of phraseology. The regula-
tions issued by the Secretary of Labor are silent upon the question. 
The LMRDA also guarantees the right to nominate and sup-
port candidates, to run for office, to get written notice of the elec-
tion, and to vote without "improper interference or reprisal of any 
kind."94 Every member is guaranteed one vote, a provision which 
not only invalidates the practice of limiting the vote to a special 
class of members but which also assures apprentices and even em-
ployers a voice in the selection of the officers of any labor organiza-
89 Compare Wellington, "Union Democracy and Fair Representation," 67 YALE L.J. 
1327 at 1347-1349 (1958), with Cox, "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy," 
72 HARv. L. REv. 609 at 624-629 (1959). 
90 Section 401 (b). 
91 Section 401 (a). 
92 Section 401 (d). 
93 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st sess., §301 (1959). 
94 Section 401 (e). 
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tion to which they may belong.95 The statute attempts to preserve 
the integrity of the election by giving each candidate the right to 
have an observer at the polls and the counting of the ballots. In 
international elections the results of the balloting must be pub-
lished separately for each local union.96 The division of sentiment 
in a single local is usually well enough known to its members to 
reveal any serious dishonesty in counting the ballots provided that 
the figures are not concealed by lumping them into a single total 
with the results in other local unions. Compliance with the union's 
constitution and by-laws is made a statutory obligation in order that 
the federal remedy may be available for violations.97 
To prevent union officials from gaining improper advantage, 
section 401 (e) requires a union to distribute any candidate's cam-
paign literature to the members at his own expense, and to refrain 
from discrimination between candidates in making other facilities 
available. Section 40 I (g) prohibits using union funds to promote 
the candidacy of any person. The administration of the latter pro-
vision will require delicate judgments. When a union president 
visits major locals on union business during the months before an 
election, he is not unmindful of his political fences. The inter-
national representative who goes to another city to handle griev-
ances may be expected to discuss an impending election. The in-
cumbents invariably command more space in the union newspaper 
than the opposition. Legislation can no more wipe out these ad-
vantages than it can prevent a President's dramatic move toward 
world peace from aiding his campaign for reelection. The statute 
obviously forbids such grossly unfair tactics as hiring additional 
organizers to campaign for the reelection of incumbent officials or 
using the union treasury to send out election propaganda. 
The demand that all candidates be given access to the union's 
membership lists produced sharp debate in Congress because two 
irreconcilable principles were at stake. Since a candidate seeking 
to defeat the incumbents would be hampered by the lack of a vot-
ing list, access to membership lists became a symbol of truly demo-
cratic elections in the eyes of those congressmen who would not 
count it a loss if labor unions were damaged in the process. On the 
other hand, the unions attach great importance to the secrecy of 
their membership lists because employers, rival unions and sub-
versive organizations have often sought to obtain lists for improper 
95 See pp. 833-834 supra. 
96 Section 401 (e). 
97 Section 401 (e) and (f). 
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purposes. Under present conditions the need for secrecy is probably 
exaggerated, but one friendly to the labor movement could hardly 
ignore the strength of the tradition or the force of experience even 
though he was also driven to acknowledge that the preservation of 
secrecy diminished the fairness of the election. In the end a com-
promise was reached which gives a candidate the right to inspect a 
list of members who are employed under union security contracts, 
once within thirty days of the election and ·without copying the 
lists. This limited privilege can hardly be abused.98 
Enforcement of the election requirements is vested in the Sec-
retary of Labor. A member desiring to challenge an election must 
first invoke his remedies within the organization. After they are 
exhausted or if three months elapse without a decision, he may file 
a complaint with the Secretary who, upon investigation, will either 
dismiss the complaint or file an action in the federal court to set 
aside the election. The complaint is to be upheld only if it appears 
that the violation of the statute "may have affected the outcome of 
an election."99 It would be wasteful to set aside an election for 
violations which could not have affected the result but obviously 
proof that the outcome would have been different is not required. 
If an election is set aside, the Secretary is to conduct a new elec-
tion.100 An appeal may be taken from a court order directing an 
election, but in the interests of expedition there may be no stay 
pending the appeal.101 In order to preserve continuity in the 
management of union affairs and discourage "strike suits" the 
statute creates a presumption of the validity of an election until a 
final judicial decision. 
The foregoing provisions seem adequate to guarantee free and 
fair union elections. They descend too far into detail, impairing 
the ideal of self-government, but there is no requirement which 
can seriously hamper a union's normal functioning. Only the 
requirement of individual notice of elections on stated occasions 
can be criticized as expensive,1°2 and the cost is certainly no more 
than ten cents a member for each election. 
Section 403 provides careful and apparently sound rules con-
cerning the relation between state and federal law. State regula-
tion of union elections is barred in the interest of uniformity. 
98 Section 401 (c). 
99 Section 402 (c). 
lOOlbid. 
101 Section 402 (d). 
102 Section 401 (e). 
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International and national unions operate in many states. It would 
be confusing, unduly burdensome, and often impossible for them 
to comply with a variety of election laws. No corporation is sub-
ject to such burdens in the election of its officers. The same con-
siderations apply with lesser force to local unions. A considerable 
number function in several states. The burden of checking com-
pliance is likely to fall upon the international union. It is also 
easier to enforce one uniform rule than a crazy-quilt of state legis-
lation. Finally, ill-considered state laws would interfere with the 
national labor policy. Too stringent laws would handicap unions 
in dealing with employers. Too frequent elections might result 
in union instability. A comparatively stable leadership can devote 
itself to constructive action thereby serving both employees and the 
public. 
Since these considerations do not apply to a suit to enforce a 
union's own constitution or by-laws, section 403 preserves state 
remedies prior to an election. A proceeding to challenge an elec-
tion already conducted should bind all interested persons; con-
sequently the statutory remedy is made exclusive. 
C. International Trusteeships 
The constitutions of many international unions authorize the 
international officers to suspend the normal government of a con-
stituent local union, assume control of its property, and conduct 
its affairs. The guiding standard is usually vague. For example, 
the constitution of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees provides 
that the General President may appoint a trustee if he "decides that 
any of the officers of a local union are dishonest or grossly incom-
petent or that the organization is not being conducted for the best 
interests of the Local and International."103 
It needs no argument to demonstrate that placing a local union 
in trusteeship involves serious impairment of both liberty and self-
government. Thereafter all decisions affecting the local are made 
by officials appointed by the international. The local officers are 
suspended. There are no new local elections. The members can 
hold no meetings unless the trustee approves. Often the members 
lose even the power to choose delegates to international conven-
tions, thus becoming unable to influence the policies of the inter-
national or the conduct of its affairs. It seems probable, moreover, 
that the threat of imposing a trusteeship is often an effective way 
103 Mixed Local of Hotel Employees v. Hotel Employees, 212 Minn. 587 at 590, n. 2, 
4 N.W. (2d) 771 (1942). 
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to compel a local union to conform to instructions of the inter-
national officers which are contrary to the desires of the members. 
Nevertheless, any thoughtful discussion of union trusteeships 
must recognize their indispensability. Trusteeships are one device, 
perhaps the primary device, by which international officers can 
keep the labor movement strong and effective, untainted by cor-
ruption, and free from subversion. In his testimony before a Sen-
ate subcommittee AFL-CIO President Meany noted that a trustee-
ship may be necessary to bring about the honest administration of 
local-union funds, or to restore freedom and democracy within a 
local union. "[O]ccasionally a local union officer or business agent 
secures complete control over the local, and becomes a virtual dic-
tator. He may fail to call membership meetings, hold no elections, 
and simply run the union to suit himself."104 Third, Mr. Meany 
said that a trusteeship may be a means to free a subordinate body 
from racketeers or Communist control.1°5 
Two other situations might be added to this list. One is that 
occasionally local officers act irresponsibly in collective bargaining 
or lose control over the members. The calling of unauthorized 
strikes in violation of the international's constitution or the in-
ability or unwillingness to honor collective-bargaining commit-
ments is a proper cause for international intervention.106 Second, 
if a union becomes so torn by dissent that its business is paralyzed, 
or if its local officers and members become too lazy to service exist-
ing contracts or organize non-union firms, the suspension of local 
autonomy may be the only way to rebuild an effective local organ-
ization. 
Unfortunately trusteeships have also been a virulent source of 
political autocracy and financial corruption. Some of the most 
notorious are familiar to every student of labor history. It seems 
reasonable to infer from several reported cases that thousands of 
dollars were extracted from laborers and contractors in the build-
ing of the Delaware River Aqueduct through the activities of 
Bove, Nuzzo, and their associates, with the connivance, if not sup-
port, of the international officers of the Hod Carriers Union.107 
104 Hearings on Union Financial and Administrative Practices and Procedures Before 
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 85th 
Cong., 2d sess., 64 (1958). 
105 Ibid. 
106 Cromwell v. Morrin, 91 N.Y.S. (2d) 176 (1949). 
107 See Canfield v. Moreschi, 268 App. Div. 64, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 668 (1944), affd. 294 N.Y. 
632, 64 N.E. (2d) 177 (1945); Moore v. Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 208 (1942), 
affd. 265 App. Div. 989, 40 N.Y.S. (2d) 334, modified 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E. (2d) 552 (1943); 
Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 882 (1941), modified 263 App. Div. 59, 31 
N.Y.S. (2d) 849 (1941). 
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The autocratic direction of the United Mine Workers results at 
least in part from the suspension of local self-government. Twelve 
local unions of the International Union of Operating Engineers, 
representing about twenty percent of the membership, were held 
under international supervision; seven were held in trusteeship for 
at least ten years and two for twenty-nine years.108 The McClellan 
Committee also found that thirteen percent of all the locals in the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters were under trusteeships; 
some of them were taken over more than fifteen years ago.109 No 
one should suppose that these faults were characteristic of the labor 
movement but they were nevertheless cause for great public 
concern. 
There appear to have been four chief motivations for the im-
position of improper trusteeships. 
(1) The opportunity to loot rich local treasuries has been a 
significant temptation.11° 
(2) The desire to control the policies of a local union may 
stem from honorable motives but in a good many cases there has 
been evidence of a desire to use union position for personal ad-
vantage.111 
(3) Other trusteeships have been imposed in order to keep 
in office men friendly to the international union.112 
(4) The imposition of a trusteeship may be a method of con-
trolling an international convention. Frequently the trustee ap-
pointed the delegates of the local union under his control. Since 
the General President would name a trustee friendly to himself, 
the trustee could be expected to follow the president's suggestions 
in choosing delegates, and the delegates themselves would not be 
blind to their dependence upon the president's good will. With ten 
or twenty percent of the membership in trusteeships the inter-
national officers had a strong bloc of votes. 
There is little indication that the courts afford local-union 
members adequate protection against abuse of the trusteeship de-
108 S. Rep. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 371 (1958). 
100 Id. at 448. 
110 See cases cited note 107 supra. 
111 This statement is based upon a number of trusteeships described in the McClellan 
Committee hearings. S. Rep. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 447, passim (1958). 
112 For example it is reported that when the Teamster's Local in Pontiac, Michigan 
revolted against domination by four officials accused of extortion, the International named 
Hoffa as trustee and he reappointed two as business agents. 
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vice. The courts are governed chiefly by implications of the doc-
trine that the constitution and by-laws of a voluntary association 
are a contract between the association and the members. Trustees 
designated by an international union will be enjoined from in-
terfering with the property of a local if the international officers 
failed to follow constitutional procedures.U3 Furthermore the rule 
seems to be settled, again by analogy to cases dealing with the dis-
cipline of individual members, that receivers may not be appointed 
to take over a local unless there is a fair hearing including notice 
of the charges and an opportunity to present a defense.114 Not only 
are there very few reported decisions staying or upsetting trustee-
ships upon substantive grounds but there is also pragmatic evidence 
of the inability of the common law to grant local-union members 
adequate protection against unjust trusteeships. For example, 
Hoffa was recently trustee of seventeen different locals.115 Some 
Teamsters locals have been under trusteeship for fifteen years.116 
Perhaps such facts evidence only an indifference to self-government 
so long as the union officialdom proves reasonably efficient in 
securing higher wages for the members, but it seems more likely 
that the explanation lies in the practical impediments to utilizing 
what little theoretical protection the common law affords. The 
cost of legal proceedings is likely to be heavy. Even if the suit is 
successful, the individual members will reap no monetary advan-
tage. Occasionally a group of members may feel strongly enough to 
institute an action in order to protect what they feel are intangible 
rights, but most men would not regard this as a sufficient induce-
ment for risking financial loss. The individual member who insti-
tutes an action against international officers runs considerable risk 
of reprisal and the more arbitrary the imposition of the trusteeship 
the greater are the risks imposed. 
The LMRDA remedies most of these defects. Section 301 re-
quires periodic reports to the Secretary of Labor concerning an 
international trusteeship. Section 302 establishes two standards 
for testing the legality of a trusteeship. 
113 Canfield v. Moreschi, 268 App. Div. 64, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 668 (1944), affd. 294 N.Y. 
632, 64 N.E. (2d) 177 (1945). 
114 See Local 373, Intl. Assn. of Bridge Ironworkers v. Intl. Assn. of Bridge Ironworkers, 
120 N.J. Eq. 220 at 230, 184 A. 531 (1936); Neal v. Hutcheson, 160 N.Y.S. 1007 at 1010 
(1916). 
115 S. Rep. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 448 (1958). 
116Ibid. 
850 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
(1) The trusteeship must conform to the constitution and by-
laws of the labor organization. 
(2) It may be imposed only for the purpose of "correcting 
corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of 
collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a bargaining 
representative, . . . or otherwise carrying out the legitimate 
objects [of the international union] .... " 
These standards are somewhat general, especially the last, but 
this is an area in which it is very difficult to find abstract criteria by 
which to separate measures essential to strong internal government 
from subterfuges which are oppressive or corrupt. On the other 
hand, these standards should not be difficult to follow in any par-
ticular case after the facts are developed- certainly no more diffi-
cult than to decide what is an unreasonable restraint of trade or an 
unfair method of competition. 
Section 304 attempts to supply a guideline for determining 
whether a receivership meets the statutory standard. Recognizing 
the delicate judgments which international officers are called upon 
to make in imposing a trusteeship and conscious of the relative in-
expertness of outsiders, it provides that for the first eighteen 
months a trusteeship "shall be presumed valid ... and shall not 
be subject to attack ... except upon proof that the trusteeship 
was not established in good faith for a purpose allowable under 
section 301."117 
The burden of showing lack of good faith is heavy, yet the 
possibility permits the invalidation of those receiverships which 
are shown to be only a subterfuge for an improper purpose. The 
presumption is available, however, only if the trusteeship is in-
stituted in procedural conformity with the constitution and by-
laws of the international labor organization and "authorized or 
ratified by its executive board after a fair hearing." The language 
adopts the view that the rush of events may force the international 
president to act without a hearing and therefore permits him to 
hold the hearing after the trustee has been appointed. The desire 
to gain the benefit of the presumption should be enough to induce 
a union to allow a hearing at least after the trustee's appoint-
ment.118 
117 S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d sess., §203 (c) (1958). 
11s The provision for ratification is included because a General President must some• 
times move rapidly in order to halt financial mismanagement or corruption. 
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The obnoxious element in trusteeships is their duration. The 
initial suspension of local self-government is usually justified by 
the needs of the organization, and it would unreasonably impair 
the independence of the labor movement to allow much scope at 
this point for the government to review the judgment of union 
officials as to the needs of the organization or the best means of 
effectuating them. On the other hand, the local emergency which 
justifies international intervention can normally be resolved in a 
relatively short period of time. There was some temptation, there-
fore, to fix a rigid statutory limit on the duration of trusteeships. 
Upon more careful analysis the dangers of any arbitrary time limit 
seemed clear. If Communists capture a local union, it may be more 
than eighteen months before the international officers can build up 
a group of loyal trade unionists able and willing to govern their 
own affairs despite skilled subversion. Unhappily the entire 
leadership of a local may be corrupt and its ouster may leave a 
vacuum which is not easily filled. Some flexibility is therefore 
required. 
The LMRDA attempts to solve this problem by reversing the 
presumption which applies during the first eighteen months. Sec-
tion 304 (c) provides that "[a]fter the expiration of eighteen 
months the trusteeship shall be presumed invalid unless the labor 
organization [concerned] shall show by clear and convincing proof 
that the continuation of the trusteeship is necessary for a purpose 
allowable under section 302." If a trusteeship is needed for more 
than eighteen months, surely the international officers ought to be 
able to demonstrate the reason. 
The new law also deals with two specific abuses often incident 
to trusteeships. Section 303 makes it a crime to transfer to the 
international union any funds of the local except the normal per 
capita tax and assessments payable by subordinate bodies not in 
trusteeship. This provision prevents the appointment of trustees 
for the purpose of "milking" a local treasury. The same section 
makes it unlawful to count votes of convention delegates designated 
to represent a local union held in receivership unless the delegates 
were elected by secret ballot in a general vote of the membership. 
This provision prevents the use of trusteeships to control the choice 
of delegates to an international convention. 
852 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ultimate impact of the LMRDA cannot be foretold. As 
·with any new legislation experience may well demonstrate that 
revisions are required. The legislation contains more than its share 
of problems for judicial interpretation because much of the bill 
was written on the floor of the Senate or House of Representatives 
and because many sections contain calculated ambiguities or 
political compromises essential to secure a majority. Consequently, 
in resolving them the courts would be well advised to seek out the 
underlying rationale without placing great emphasis upon close 
construction of the words. 
The new statute makes a number of contributions to the long-
range development of labor law. 
(1) The act is the first major step in the regulation of the 
internal affairs of labor unions. It expands the national labor 
policy into the area of relations between the employees and the 
labor union. Previously national policy was confined to relation-
ships between management and union. 
(2) The enactment of a federal statute dealing with the in-
ternal affairs of labor organizations commits us to the national 
development of all aspects of labor policy. The LMRDA reaches 
even farther out from interstate transportation of goods than the 
NLRA, although it would seem plain that there is power under the 
commerce clause to prevent collective bargaining representatives 
designated under the RLA and NLRA from abusing their author-
ity. If the federal government had not moved into this field, state 
legislation might have been enacted. The passage of federal legis-
lation relieved the pressure; it also makes further state action 
unlikely. This is a vast expansion of federal responsibility. 
(3) The effectiveness of the new law will depend largely 
upon the initiative and energy of union members. Apart from the 
election and receivership provisions, which can be enforced by the 
Secretary of Labor upon receipt of a complaint from an individual 
member, the LMRDA relies primarily upon individual employees 
to enforce the duties of union officials by intelligent voting or 
private suits. 
Many conscientious labor leaders and their legal advisers fear 
that the act will result in a rash of burdensome litigation, some 
financed by employers despite the statutory prohibition, which 
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will waste the unions' resources and hamper their normal activi-
ties. On the other hand, there is the danger, often expressed in the 
past, that individual employee's suits are neither an effective 
sanction nor a practical remedy. Workers are unfamiliar with the 
law and hesitate to become involved in legal proceedings. The cost 
is likely to be heavy, and they have little money with which to post 
bonds, pay lawyer's fees and print voluminous records. Time is 
always on the side of the defendant. Even if the suit is successful, 
there are relatively few situations in which the plaintiff or his at-
torney can reap financial advantage. Most men are reluctant to 
incur financial cost in order to vindicate intangible rights. In-
dividual workers who sue union officers run enormous risks, for 
there are many ways, legal as well as illegal, by which entrenched 
officials can "take care of" recalcitrant members. 
Only time can resolve the uncertainty. Although the LMRDA 
creates few rights of action which did not exist at common law, 
their codification in highly-publicized legislation will bring them 
to the attention of union members and their lawyers and, for a 
time at least, will both facilitate the litigation and reduce the fear 
of reprisals. Judges can be expected to respond to public and 
congressional opinion. Nevertheless, experience suggests that in 
the long run the volume of litigation is to be quite small. Only 
two reported decisions involve suits for an accounting for alleged 
breach of an agent's fiduciary obligations. Despite all the publicity, 
the large sums at stake and the evidence developed by the McClel-
lan Committee, there have been few actions against the Becks, 
Hoffas, Brewsters and Webers. A hundred-fold increase in the 
volume of litigation would not harm the labor movement. One 
of the proper costs of coming-of-age is the risk of unjustified litiga-
tion; the risk of unwarranted suits is the price we pay for assur-
ance that every man will have his day in court. 
In conclusion, we should recognize that the law cannot compel 
idealism or create the spirit of self-government. It cannot force 
union members to attend meetings or hold their officers to a strict 
accounting. Many of the intellectuals who grew up under the New 
Deal may have allowed a romantic glow which surrounded the 
unionism of the 1930's to obscure harsher facts, but I cannot believe 
that they were entirely wrong in sensing a vitality which had some-
thing quite different to offer than wealth and power for union 
officials and more and more monetary benefits for union members. 
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The prestige of labor unions is at a low ebb today partly because of 
the tremendous propaganda advantages gained by hostile forces 
as a result of the cynical wrongdoing of a few union leaders. But it 
is also attributable to their obscuring the basic idealism within the 
labor movement. 
